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1. Introduction
The structure of the compulsory pension system (CPS) in the Federal Republic of Germany 
has been changed fundamentally. The federal government has decided to introduce a private 
pension system on a voluntary basis. The payments to this voluntary system are to constitute a 
capital stock to supplement the payments of the compulsory pension system. Comprehensive 
fiscal subsidies will be introduced to support this change to the pension system.
This paper discusses the special situation of families with children. The second section 
investigates the extent to which families with children were able to accumulate private wealth 
in the last ten years in Germany. 
In the third section the main features of the intended changes to the compulsory pension 
system are described, and an overview of the planned fiscal subsidies is provided.
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In the fourth and final section we attempt to evaluate the changes with particular attention to 
the situation of families. 
2. The Relative Wealth and Distribution of Wealth among Families
The wealth of private households in the Federal Republic of Germany (old and new Länder) 
has increased greatly in recent years. For the year 1990 the Deutsche Bundesbank (German 
Federal Bank) calculated the net total wealth of private households to be 8.2 billion DM. For 
1 This paper is a partial result of a research project on the distribution of wealth in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and was represented at the „Eighth International Research Seminar on Issues in Social Security“ of the 
„Foundation for International Studies on Social Security“ in Sigtuna/Sweden. The research project was financed 
by the Citibank Foundation (formerly the Stiftung der Private Haushalt). Details about the pension reform were 
taken from the home pages of the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Order (Bundesministerium für Arbeit 
und Sozialordnung: www.bma.bund.de) and the Association of Public Pension Funds in Germany (Verband der 
Rentenversicherungsträger in Deutschland: www.vdr.de). The Internet pages of the ministry also describes the 
structure of the reform in English. Here we would like to thank Claus Becher for the research he performed.
2 Note that for this analysis the support measures of the compulsory pension system directed toward families 
constitute only one element of the state’s financial support for families. On the basis of the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz: GG) of the Federal Republic of Germany, according to which the Federal Republic of Germany 
constitutes a democratic and social federal state (Article 20(1) GG) in which marriage and the family are subject 
to special protection by the order of the state (Article 6 (1) GG), a variety of further measures exist for the 
support of families. Since these measures, however, do not refer directly to the connection between the support of 
families and the payments of the compulsory pension system, they will be listed here only for the sake of 
completeness. Of particular importance are child benefits, benefits for maternity or paternity leave, tax subsidies, 
increased benefit rates for unemployment insurance and additional state measures such as the subsidization of 
kindergartens and the public school system.
2the year 1997 this value increased to 12.1 billion DM (Deutsche Bundesbank 1999, 43). The 
used wealth term comprises the property assets, the financial assets and the consumer 
durables. The debts for housing and landed property and the consumer liabilities are 
subtracted from the sum, which is shown as whole gross wealth. The result is the whole net 
wealth.
The wealth of private households can be analyzed on the basis of micro-economic surveys. At 
present the Income and Consumption Surveys (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben: 
EVS) of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) are the only micro-economic 
data available. The EVS has been performed regularly, approximately every five years, since 
1962. The survey also collects information about the wealth and debts of private households. 
The results presented here are based on the surveys from the years 1988, 1993 and 1998.
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The concept of wealth is defined relatively strictly in the EVS. The total gross wealth of a 
household comprises only the sum of the gross monetary wealth and the gross property 
wealth. Debts in the form of mortgages and consumer credits are deducted from this total. 
This resulting value of net total wealth per household is used for analyses. The concept of 
wealth used here incorporates the productive wealth of private households to a relatively 
minor degree, as it is taken into consideration only when it exists in the form of quoted shares. 
The study does not take consumer durables into account at all.
In analyzing the results it is also important to note that the EVS does not represent all groups 
of households in the Federal Republic of Germany. For instance, households with a monthly 
net household income of over 35,000 DM are not included, as too few households at this level 
of income took part in the survey. Neither individuals without a permanent residence nor the 
institutionalized population are included in the survey. The inequality of the distribution of 
wealth described here is undervalued as a result. Furthermore it should be mentioned that the 
households of foreigners were questioned only since the year 1993 and that the results for the 
year 1988 are valid only for the old Länder.
On the basis of the empirical results below we investigate the wealth of families with children 
as compared to that of families without children. Of particular interest is whether families 
with children have been able to amass great amounts of assets in the past. Here the net total 
wealth of a household is divided by the number of persons living there. This means that the 
3 The results are determined using an 80-percent depersonalized sub-sample from which are grossed up to the 
entire population. Because the sub-sample of any given year includes approximately 50,000 households, it is 
possible to break down the samples extensively according to various Socio-Economic criteria. At present there 
are very few analyses of the distribution of wealth in Germany which are based on micro-economic data over a 
long period of time. Particularly worthy of mention are the Ergebnisse der Bundesregierung (Results of the 
Federal Government) 2001, 44-74, of the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung (German Council of Economics Advisors) 2000, 261-269, by Schüssler et al. 2000 and by Hauser 
and Stein 2001.
3results presented here were calculated on the basis of per-capita assets.
4 The outcomes are in 
generally valid for persons, who live in households discriminated by the respective household 
typ. For cause of simplicity we will speak only of households in the following.
Table 1 shows the average net wealth of private households in western Germany on the 
personal level for the years 1988, 1993 and 1998, divided by type of household. Since 
reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany did not occur until 1990, the corresponding 
values for eastern Germany are included only for 1993 and 1998. The percentile values also 
included are based on the average for the total sample of a given survey year, whereby 
separate averages are calculated for western and eastern Germany. The analysis does not 
differentiate between households comprised of unmarried couples and married couples: 
decisive for the classification as a particular type of household is the existence of a shared 
household. The “other households” are a residual group comprising shared residences and 
families in which other relatives reside.
First, let us examine western Germany. From Table 1 it is evident that the relative wealth of 
all types of households with children fell in comparison to the total average over the period 
from 1988 to 1998. In 1998, couples with one child attained a value of only 85%, and those 
with two or more children only 66% of the average for all households. At just 46%, the 
relative wealth of single parents in 1998 is far below the average. This development is 
particularly evident for the second period of investigation from 1993 to 1998, as here even the 
absolute values sank for the household types with children, and especially for single-parent 
households. 
In contrast, couples without children occupy an extremely superior position of relative wealth, 
with a value of 142%. For this group of households the possibility that both partners are 
gainfully employed makes it possible to amass an above-average amount of wealth. A great 
improvement in the relative wealth of single men is also evident, for this group was able to 
double its average wealth from 76,000 DM to 151,000 DM in the period from 1988 to 1998, 
while the average for all households during this period increased from 73,000 DM to 
118,000 DM, or only around 60%.
In eastern Germany, reunification made for a special situation. In general we observe 
significantly lower assets than in western Germany. However, the clear trend is that eastern 
Germany is catching up, as evident in the rise in the average total wealth of all households 
from 32,000 DM in 1993 to 45,000 DM in 1998, an increase of over 40%. While the average 
4 Here we assume the equal distribution of wealth within a given household, an assumption which certainly 
deserves critical scrutiny. However, in comparing the relative wealth of various households this per capita wealth 
appears more sensible than the wealth of an entire household, as the latter would entail the direct comparison of 
the values of one-person households with those comprising four or more members.
4value in eastern Germany in 1993 was only 30% of the western German value, the figure of 
comparison reached 38% just five years later.
Table 1: Net wealth of private households in western and eastern Germany on the individual 
level in the years 1988 through 1998, by type of household (amounts given in DM and 
percentages calculated from the respective average)
Type of household
West East
1988 1993 1998 1993 1998
Single women 75,000
102%
123,000
112%
127,000
108%
29,000
92%
35,000
79%
Single men 76,000
105%
124,000
113%
151,000
128%
36,000
111%
42,000
93%
Couples without 
children
100,000
137%
154,000
140%
167,000
142%
40,000
124%
59,000
131%
Couples with 1 child 73,000
101%
103,000
94%
101,000
85%
33,000
102%
45,000
101%
Couples with 2 or more 
children
58,000
79%
80,000
72%
78,000
66%
29,000
90%
39,000
87%
Single parents 44,000
60%
67,000
61%
54,000
46%
13,000
41%
18,000
40%
Other households 67,000
91%
113,000
103%
138,000
117%
39,000
121%
56,000
125%
Total 73,000
100%
110,000
100%
118,000
100%
32,000
100%
45,000
100%
Notes: Amounts rounded up to the next 1,000 DM. Every average value is calculated per capita for the respective 
type of household.
Source: EVS Database of the Chair of Social Policy of the Goethe University of Frankfurt a.M.; own 
calculations.
The relative wealth of couples with children in the new federal states can be viewed somewhat 
more favorably than that of the same groups in the old federal states, for the eastern couples 
with children were able to maintain their relative wealth positions and even achieve 
significant improvement in terms of absolute wealth. Especially inferior is the relative wealth 
of single parents, however, as these exhibit only a minimum level of wealth in 1998, with an 
average of 18,000 DM, or only 40% of the average value for all eastern German households. 
5As in western Germany, in the five new federal states the situation of couples without children 
is relatively good: they achieved a level of 131% of the average of all eastern German 
households.
In summary, from Table 1 can be concluded that the average family with children in western 
Germany was not able to amass any wealth over the last five years observed. Moreover, the 
particularly unfavourable wealth situation of single parents in both parts of the country is 
striking. In contrast, couples without children achieve the highest average levels of wealth in 
both eastern and western Germany.
The average values mentioned here do not offer any information about the distribution of 
income within individual socioeconomic groups. For this reason a more in-depth analysis of 
distribution was performed by dividing each household group into sub-groups according to 
relative wealth. Here, too, the values are based on wealth per capita. Only the last survey year, 
1998, is considered below.
From Table 2 it is evident that a total of 5.4 % of the households in western Germany are 
overindebted. However, it must be noted that consumer durables are not taken into account in 
the concept of wealth and these debts thus may be balanced by them. 20.9% of households 
possess only “emergency reserves,” comprising less than 11,800 DM in 1998. On the other 
hand, 22.2% of households have 1.5 times or more the average net wealth per person. These 
households thus possess a net wealth of over 177,000 DM per person.
Regarding the individual types of households it is evident that couples with one child and 
couples with two or more children are represented in the lowest two groups about as 
frequently as the total average of all households, a rate of around 26%. These groups endowed 
with below-average wealth include higher proportions of single men (39.3%), and especially 
single parents (57.1%). 
Table 2: Distribution of persons in private households by relative magnitude of net wealth in 
1998 in western Germany (amounts in % of all persons) 
Type of household
Net wealth 
from .. to .. of 
the average
Single 
woman
Single 
man
Couples 
without 
children
Couples 
with 1 
child
Couples 
with 2 
or more 
children
Single 
parents
Other 
house-
holds
Total
Negative
Wealth 4.7 10.1 3.7 6.1 5.2 11.7 (3.6) 5.4
60 up to 0.1 31.2 29.2 14.7 20.2 19.2 45.4 13.4 20.9
0.1 up to 0.5 25.6 21.4 20.4 21.6 25.5 19.1 15.7 22.3
0.5 up to 1.0 8.3 9.2 10.4 18.6 27.3 9.3 21.2 17.0
1.0 up to 1.5 5.2 4.7 12.8 15.2 13.8 5.3 18.7 12.2
1.5 and over 24.9 25.5 38.0 18.4 9.0 9.2 27.3 22.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The total average per person is 117,979 DM. For values in parentheses the number of cases is less than 
60.
Source: EVS Database of the Chair of Social Policy of the Goethe University of Frankfurt a.M.; own 
calculations.
At the other end of the spectrum, the category with the greatest wealth, meaning 1.5 times or 
more the average wealth of all households, include fewer couples with one child (18.4%) and 
especially few couples with two or more children (9,0%) as compared to the average of all 
households (22.2%). This is also proven for single parents: 9.2% are in this category of 
wealth. 
By 1998, in contrast, couples without children were represented in the highest category of 
wealth with above-average frequency (38.0%). 
As a result it can be concluded that Table 2 also shows the below-average possibilities in 
western Germany for couples with two or more children, and especially for single parents, to 
amass wealth.
The distributional situation in eastern Germany in 1998 is illustrated in Table 3. In the lower 
categories of wealth it shows great similarities to the western German case. In this part of 
Germany  6.3%   of   households   are  overindebted   and   16.1%   of   households   have  only 
“emergency reserves.” Due to the lower amount of wealth possessed in eastern Germany, 
these reserves are less than 4,500 DM.
5
The two lowest categories of wealth include 35.4% of single men and 52.0% of single parents. 
These groups are thus represented significantly more frequently in the group of households 
that are overindebted or achieve only a minimum level of wealth than the 22.4% of all 
households.
Table 3: Distribution of persons in private households by relative magnitude of net wealth in 
1998 in eastern Germany (amounts in % of all persons) 
5 It should be mentioned that this value is very low. The net income of east German households was 80% of the 
value for the west German households in the year 1998. If we would transfer this relation to the analysis of 
wealth the value for the „emergency reserves“ was 80% of the west German value and so 9,500 DM.
7Type of household
Net wealth
from .. to ..of 
the average
Single 
woman
Single 
man
Couples 
without 
children
Couples 
with 1 
child
Couples 
with 2 
or more 
children
Single 
parents
Other 
house-
olds
Total
Negative 
Wealth (2.8) (9.7) 3.4 6.5 9.0 12.2 [3.6] 6.3
0 up to 0.1 26.0 25.7 10.4 13.7 13.8 39.8 (9.4) 16.1
0.1 up to 0.5 34.8 28.1 28.9 29.7 27.3 28.5 28.3 29.1
0.5 up to 1.0 17.0 13.4 19.7 15.3 18.0 7.7 (14.9) 16.8
1.0 up to 1.5 7.6 (5.1) 10.0 11.0 11.5 [4.1] (13.6) 10.0
1.5 and over 11.8 18.0 27.5 23.9 20.3 7.8 30.1 21.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The total average per person is 44,611 DM. For values in parentheses the number of households in the 
cells is less than 60; for values in square brackets, under 30.
Source: EVS Database of the Chair of Social Policy of the Goethe University of Frankfurt a.M.; own 
calculations.
Now let us turn to the highest category of wealth. In contrast to western Germany, at 20.3% 
the relative wealth of couples with 2 or more children in eastern Germany hardly deviates 
from the value for all households in that region, 21.6%. At 23.9% of households, couples with 
one child are actually over-represented in this category of wealth. As in western Germany, 
eastern German single parents achieve such a high level of wealth quite rarely (7.8%). And in 
contrast to the old federal states, this statement is also true for single women, for whom the 
corresponding value is only 11.8%.
The analyses of the distribution of wealth in the Federal Republic of Germany have shown 
that families with children have had greater problems amassing wealth than other groups of 
households. This is true to a greater degree for families with more children, especially in 
western Germany.
Furthermore single parents in both parts of the country are endowed with far below the 
average amount of wealth. Thus the relative wealth of this household group must be described 
as especially poor.
83. Pension Reform with Special Allowances for Families
3.1 The Existing System of Old-age Pensions
Through the introduction of a mandatory old-age pension, protection of the older generation 
was shifted to a societal level.This system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Through such a system the individual risks of age of the generation gainfully employed, be 
they childlessness, loss of income due to illness, unemployment, premature inability to work 
or death of a partner, are borne by society as a whole as a kind of insurance and reduced to an 
average risk. Such risks could be borne only in part or with great difficulty by an entirely 
private old-age pension system.
The German CPS is a benefit-defined system. Pension claims are accumulated during the 
entire working life. Each year the individual wage is compared to average wage. If the 
individual wage equals average wage the insured person receives one remuneration point. 
Higher or lower individual wages result in more or less than one remuneration point. At 
retirement the remuneration points are added up and multiplied by a factor depending on the 
current average net wages (pension formula).
However,   the   existing   compulsory  pension   system   would   face   considerable   financing 
problems in the future without a pension reform, for if the present demographic developments 
continue, the rates of contribution will not suffice to maintain current pension levels. The 
causes are steadily declining birth rates and a simultaneously rising life expectancy over the 
last decades, without any significant change in the age at which the working population enters 
retirement.
6 This development is expected to continue in the future. Accompanied by a strong 
rise in the percentage of the elderly, the result would be steadily increasing rates of 
contribution.
7 
3.2 Reorganization of the System of Old-age Insurance
The German government reformed fundamentally the system of old-age insurance. The goal 
of the reform is to initiate broad-based, voluntary funded old-age insurance for employees as a 
supplement to the existing system. These new ways of capital formation are designed to 
6 An overall view of the age of working people entering retirement is given in „Übersicht über das Sozialrecht“ 
(Ed. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1998, 245). This table is valid for the CPS of workers and 
employees for the years 1957 to 1996. It shows that the age for entering retirement for women was 58,6 years in 
the year 1957 and 60,9 years in the year 1996. For men there was almost no difference between this classes with 
59,9 years in 1957 and 59,6 years in 1996. The fluctuation of retirement age between the years 1957 and 1996 
was around two years.
7 As of 01-01-2001 the rate of contribution to the compulsory state pension system was 19.1%, whereby 50% of 
this contribution was borne by the employer and 50% by the employee. Model calculations indicated an expected 
rise in the rate of contribution to 26% in the year 2030 if no changes were implemented. The net pension level is 
defined here as the ratio of the gross pension of an average earner  with 45 contribution years (basic pensioner) 
less contribution for health insurance to the average net income of the pension insured persons. Currently this 
pension level is around 70%.
9guarantee an adequate standard of living for the elderly despite a reduction of the public 
pensions. The reform will result in a future pension level that is oriented toward a rate of 
contribution legally limited to a maximum of 22%. Thus the increase in the rate of 
contribution described above will be restricted. However, this will lead to a reduced pension 
level of currently around 70 % to at least 67% in the future. In addition, the predicted increase 
in part-time work will lower the average income, further dampening the rates of increase for 
pensions such that these will fall even further behind the income trend for full-time 
employees. The capital based additional pension is to compensate for these reductions in 
pension payments.
The main features of the elements implemented to reorganize the pension system are 
described below. Special attention is paid to the support measures specific to families; these 
are then related back to the findings about income distribution discussed in the previous 
sections. 
First of all it must be mentioned that the reform 2001 of the CPS will lead to some structural 
improvements. This is particularly valid for women who are or were engaged in child care.
A combination of changes to the evaluation of periods of contributing to the CPS through 
part-time work combined with bringing up children, and changes in the form of the survivors’ 
pension are to take better account of parenting in old-age insurance. Besides the revaluation of 
child-rearing, pension claims earned through part-time employment by the parents are also 
increased: a parent working part time now has the right to a pension calculated at the level of 
an average income -- for each year until the child has reached the age of eleven. If no 
employment is possible because the parent is bringing up several children, nevertheless 
remuneration points are awarded for the old-age pension.
For persons over 65 years of age, a needs-based basic pension is to be introduced which 
should prevent poverty in old age and in the case of permanent inability to work better than 
does the existing social welfare system. This basic pension is conceived as special social 
welfare without resort to children and parents.
Figure 1 offers a simplified overview of the planned structure of future old-age insurance for 
employees, whereby distinctions are made among different groups of the population according 
to generation-membership and level of wealth. The following comments are restricted in this 
analysis to income and thus to the consumption potential. These remarks extend beyond this 
in considering the desire and potential to donate or bequeath wealth to the succeeding 
generation. This motive of transmission through inheritance is customary among many 
10elements of the population, for the life-cycle hypothesis that each old-age generation uses up 
the wealth it saved has been disproved empirically. 
The investigation is simplified through the use of a three-generation model of society. In this 
extremely schematic model, the intermediate generation receives its primary income from 
work. This income then also supports the young, not yet employable generation. In addition to 
these private transfers from the intermediate to the younger generation, in Germany state 
transfers are also provided (child benefits, benefits for maternity or paternity leave, etc.) to 
support families in their socio-political function of bringing up children.
Similarly, the payments from the CPS for the older generation that has left the workplace are 
financed by the intermediate generation. Jumping forward one generation, the younger 
generation   becomes   the   intermediate   generation,   the   intermediate   becomes   the   older 
generation, and what previously was the older generation is deceased.
Figure 1: Three-generation contract with voluntary committed and subsidized wealth creation 
for old age on the individual level
Young 
Generation
      priv.
   transfer Intermediate Generation Older Generation
de-
ceas-
ed       state
   transfer
without 
wealth 
creation
with 
wealth 
creation 
for   old 
age
with wealth 
creation for 
old age and 
inheritance
    state
  transfe
r
without 
wealth
with 
wealth   f. 
old age 
with 
wealth f. 
old   age 
+ 
inherit.
Source: own illustration
The pension reform currently underway supplements this system with a voluntary model of 
self-provision committed to this purpose and subsidized by the state. A prerequisite for this is 
high capital formation by the working population and the opportunity to invest capital. During 
the phase of gainful employment, capital is saved and private wealth accumulated. This 
wealth, together with the returns on this wealth, are to contribute to financing consumption 
early transfer
inheritance
11and thus the standard of living in old age. The system of capital funding is thus added to the 
existing apportionment system. To prevent the accumulated wealth from being consumed in 
part or in full due to a contingency occurring during the phase of gainful employment, the 
wealth saved is committed to the pension so that using it up is prohibited before retirement 
age has been reached. In order to make the voluntary savings model attractive to large sectors 
of the population, this renunciation of consumption during the phase of gainful employment is 
subsidized by the state. 
The formula for adjusting pensions also has been changed so that pension adjustment is 
dependent on the rise in average gross wages, on the change in the rate of compulsory 
contribution to the CPS and on the imputed rate of savings for voluntary old-age insurance. 
This new adjustment formula results in a step-by-step reduction of the pension level and a 
lower rise of each individual pension than the system today provides for.
Under the new system, the compulsory rate of contribution for the employer is to rise to no 
more than 11% by the year 2030. For the employee, on the other hand, the sum of the 
compulsory rate of contribution and the imputed rate of savings is to climb to 15%. With this 
the existing equal financing of old-age insurance by employer and employee has been 
abandoned, at least in part. However, old-age insurance provided by companies is to be 
improved and linked to the new instrument of private old-age insurance. Through this the 
employer may be integrated more strongly into the new system.
The intermediate gainfully employed generation is composed of three subgroups:
8 
The first group comprises households without wealth creation. In old age, this group lives 
only from the payments of the CPS. The form of voluntary savings for old age presumably 
will have the consequence that only part of the population will make sufficient provisions for 
old age. In some cases the reason may be that future needs are underestimated; in others, the 
present income may not be high enough to allow for the necessary savings. An additional 
problem involves the occurrence of non-insured contingencies among youths or individuals in 
the workforce. These problems can lead to poverty if the payments from the apportionment 
system are reduced to a considerable degree. 
Based on the results represented in Tables 2 and 3 in section 2, the group that does not make 
voluntary provisions for old age would likely include at least those households which are 
either overindebted or have at their disposal less than one tenth of the average level of wealth. 
8 For the sake of simplification the fluctuation between subgroups is not considered in this description.
12These households of the lowest two wealth categories comprise around 25% of all households 
in eastern and western Germany.
9
The second group comprises households with voluntary wealth creation for the purpose of 
consumption in old age. These households will exhaust the supply of wealth saved for old age 
by the time they die, leaving no substantial inheritance. The size of this group is quite difficult 
to estimate, as it depends on many factors which are difficult to determine.
Thirdly, there is a group of households with wealth creation for the purpose of consumption in 
old age that also saves capital to bequeath to the next generation. This group itself may 
receive additional inheritances.
10  These households include at least those households with 
over 1.5 times the average wealth at their disposal. This group thus should include at least 
20% of the population, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 in section 2.
Accordingly, the older generation consists of three subgroups:
The first subgroup comprises those persons who have not accumulated any wealth. These 
persons live only from the payments of the apportionment system and from state transfers.
The second subgroup accumulated wealth during the phase of gainful employment, but uses 
up practically all of this wealth by the time it dies.
And the third subgroup accumulated wealth through its own savings and may have been able 
to increase this wealth further through inheritances received. These individuals can support 
their costs of living both from state transfers and from returns on their wealth and the 
liquidation of their wealth. Because this group generally can use part of its total income to 
increase its savings, the inheritance available upon its death increases.
3.3 Description of the Planned Support
Planned is the introduction of a voluntary, supplementary provision for old-age. This 
provision is individualized and accompanied by a tax-free allowance for contributions to 
saving up to a level of four percent of the monthly wage. The tax subsidy may not exceed the 
limit for calculating contributions to the CPS.
11  A state subsidy may be claimed as an 
9 The argument against this view would be that especially younger households are not yet in a position to 
accumulate larger assets so that a larger amount of wealth is present by the end of the phase of gainful 
employment. While it is correct that the average level of wealth of a household increases with the age of the head 
of the household, control calculations for the year 1998 showed that the proportion of households in the two 
lowest wealth categories which are headed by an elderly member is only slightly lower than the value for all 
households.
10 The households in this sub-group are certainly not the only ones that may inherit. For the sake of simplification 
in the context of this study, however, it is assumed that (more extensive) inheritances are linked to the 
opportunity to create additional capital supplementary to voluntary old-age insurance.
11 The CPS reform 2001 is relevant only for employees insured by the compulsory pension system. However, the 
intention is to apply this reform to other sub-systems of old-age insurance as well, at least in its general approach. 
These sub-systems include support for civil servants, agricultural pensions and perhaps professional pension 
systems as well. Those changes to old-age insurance provided by companies also implemented in the reform are 
13alternative to the tax subsidy. This payment is dependent on the number of children and 
decreases as a percent of income when income rises.
12 
 It consists of a basic allowance per year 
of up to 300 DM per adult and a child allowance of 360 DM per child.
13 Hence state support 
for contributions to savings favors families with children. Initially it is reduced as income 
rises, but the opportunity for a tax subsidy effects a U-shaped percentile rate of subsidization. 
This effect is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 for various types of households and income 
levels. The highest percentile savings subsidy will be received by those households which 
earn very little income and by those which earn most. This tempts speculation that on the one 
hand households with low income can not use the high percentage support because of their 
low ability to save. On the other hand households that earn high incomes will be able to use 
the subsidy by shifting elements of wealth or previous savings, without having to increase 
savings at all. This subsidy generates a strong incentive to take advantage of free ride effects.
Figure 2: Rate of State Benefits for Savings Contributions to Private Pension Plans as a 
Function of Household Income subject to CPS, in %
also to be applied to the supplementary support in the civil service.
12 A check of beneficialness yields the following income values for which a tax-free allowance is more 
advantageous than the direct state subsidy (values refer to gross annual income): singles without children 
30,600 DM; single parents with 1 child 47,000 DM; single parents with 2 children 60,000 DM; married without 
children 62,000 DM; married with 1 child 78,000 DM; married with 2 children 93,800 DM, and married with 3 
children 107,000 DM.
13 The values given here refer to the final stage of the reform in the year 2008. Before that the rates of support 
will be introduced step by step in 2002, 2004 and 2006. In the final stage, subsidization by the state will amount 
to 20 billion DM per year.
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The capital can be invested only in state-certified forms of investment which guarantee that 
the funds are committed to old-age insurance. Only the nominally deposited capital must be 
guaranteed when the age of retirement is reached. There is no legally prescribed payment of 
interest as for capital-based life insurance.
4. Assessment and Summary
Due to the planned institutional changes, only limited prognoses are possible about the 
financial security of the older generation of the future. However, on the basis of the planned 
changes, several tendencies can be expected:
· The lack of wealth owned by the lower 25% of households makes it appear improbable 
that all households will perform substantial voluntary wealth creation to supplement the 
state’s old-age insurance. State support presumably will lead to additional savings 
15primarily in households that already were able to accumulate a moderate capital stock. In 
contrast, the wealthiest group already can use the wealth it owns to maintain its standard 
of living. There is the danger of free riders emerging if this group of households partially 
replaces its existing investments through the new forms of investment to be created and 
subsidized by the state.
· Also worthy of criticism is  the law’s stipulation  that only the nominal  value of 
investments be guaranteed, as the real value of these deposits may be significantly lower 
once a phase of gainful employment lasting twenty or thirty years comes to a close. 
Introducing a minimum interest payment would have reduced this risk to some degree. 
Also missing is any guarantee of complete protection against inflation or a supplementary 
pension that rises with the real rate of wage growth.
· Different levels of success achieved by the providers of various financial products may 
result in a wide gap between the values of different supplementary pensions. Depositors 
also face the danger of insufficient consultation and advertising by the suppliers of 
investment opportunities. Temporal variations in the value of capital and interest rates also 
may mean that some enter retirement during an unfavorable situation for capital markets. 
All of these effects increase the risk for the older generation of the future.
· Since the supplemental provision was not set up as compulsory insurance for all 
individuals covered by the CPS, many elements of this system of social compensation no 
longer can be executed directly. In particular, it can not compensate for the different life 
expectancies of men and women, as the free selection among certified investment products 
prevents the introduction of a unisex life-expectancy table. Thus women either must save 
more for a certain supplementary pension than men, or receive a lower supplementary 
pension for equal contributions to savings.
· If events like illness, unemployment and premature disability occur, causing a loss of 
income during the phase of gainful employment, it appears questionable that an individual 
can continue during this period to set aside the savings intended for a supplementary 
private pension. However, the suspension of a contract or a reduction in payments results 
in a lower supplementary pension. Thus the risk of an even wider range of values of 
supplementary pensions arises, as the risks mentioned above often are more likely to occur 
in the lower wage groups.
· The improvements to the CPS for women in the form of increased claims for child-rearing 
are cancelled out by the reductions by the level of the compulsory pension.
16· The wealth created in the context of the savings committed to old-age provision will be 
wealth earmarked for consumption in old age. Since it cannot be bequeathed directly, the 
widespread desire to leave an inheritance cannot be realized.
· There is the risk that the subsidization of savings for old age will be reduced in a few years 
for budgetary reasons. Such a reduction would especially affect those from the lower 
income classes who are dependent on life-long supplementary support for the process of 
accumulating savings and who are particularly affected by a reduced level of the CPS.
In sum, the planned pension reform could indeed result in supplementary savings as a 
provision for old age. The effects of an increased stock of capital may be positive. On the 
other hand, the problems and dangers of the planned reform listed  above cannot be 
overlooked. Especially for families  with children, this raises the question  of whether 
households are at all able to set aside the supplementary contributions to savings and whether 
the improvements introduced to the CPS will prove to be enduring. Thus the inequality of the 
distribution of wealth among the individual types of households described here presumably 
will not decrease.
From the perspective of social and distribution policy it would have made sense to perform 
model calculations to check what increases in payments would have been possible in the 
system of the CPS if the reform would have been done without the voluntary saving scheme 
for the old age and the generous volume of subsidies had been used instead to subsidize the 
CPS. 
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